Also known as the Battle of Hare’s Hill, the early morning assault on March 25th was the last major attempts by the Army of Northern Virginia to break the siege of Petersburg. The past few months of continuous warfare had left the Confederate army weakened - desertion, disease, shortage of supplies and food, and lack of manpower to fill the ranks. On March 6th, General Robert E. Lee summoned 2nd Corps commander Major General John B. Gordon to his headquarters. Lee told Gordon, “there seemed to be but one thing that we could do — fight. To stand still was death.” Weeks later on March 25th, 1865, after careful calculation, Gordon put into motion a pre-dawn strike against Fort Stedman. A well-constructed Federal fort, Stedman sat across from Colquitt’s Salient, a Confederate line of strong earthworks. The distance between Fort Stedman and Colquitt’s Salient was one of the closest along the siege lines of fortifications. Gordon hoped that taking Fort Stedman would not only roll up the Federal lines, allowing for an all out assault on the main Federal supply base at City Point (General Ulysses S. Grant’s headquarters were here), but also capture and destroy the U.S. Military Railroad and supply depot less than a mile behind the fort.

The attack would be primarily made by the three divisions of Gordon’s 2nd Corps and two brigades from Major General Bushrod Johnson’s Division of Lieutenant General Richard Anderson’s 4th Corps. Another four brigades from the 3rd Corps stood in reserve — about 15,000 men in total. Facing these assaulting columns were the men of Major General John Parke’s Federal 9th Corps.

At 4:15 a.m., the Battle of Fort Stedman began. In the morning darkness, Confederate pioneers advanced and began cutting down and disassembling the Federal obstructions in front of Fort Stedman. A small handpicked assault team (10 men from each regiment in Brigadier General Matt Ransom’s Brigade) led by Lieutenant Joseph B. Hawkins of the 25th North Carolina Infantry followed closely behind. These men were ordered to take Fort Stedman silently. Carrying unloaded muskets, Lieutenant Hawkins and his North Carolinians secured the fort. How this was carried out is not definitively known. The North Carolinians could have acted as Southern deserters seeking shelter within Union lines or pretended to be retreating Union pickets posted in between the siege lines. Another explanation could be the North Carolinians used speed and surprise to their advantage. How Fort Stedman was captured so quickly by such a small number of men without firing a shot may never be known. However, using whatever means necessary Lieutenant Hawkins and his small band of North Carolinians carried out their orders, completely surprising the Federal garrison and paving the way for the Confederate capture of the fort.

Soon afterwards, a handpicked group of sharpshooters advanced next, capturing fortified Federal batteries of artillery and widening the Confederate breakthrough. “They fired no shots,” wrote Captain John Deane, the commander of the 29th Massachusetts Infantry, “but used the butts of their muskets.” This, in turn, was quickly followed by the rest of Gordon’s men, who were poised for the attack. Colonel Napoleon McLaughlen of the 57th Massachusetts Infantry, the Federal 9th Corps officer in charge of the Fort Stedman sector, quickly attempted to throw lines of defense together as the sounds of the attack reached his ears. In the darkness, while attempting to order what he supposed to be part of the Union picket line into the fray, McLaughlen realized he was giving orders to Confederates. Lieutenant William Gwyn, commanding the sharpshooters of the 31st Georgia Infantry, appeared out of the darkness and demanded his surrender. After the Georgians captured him, they took McLaughlen to Gordon, to whom he surrendered his sword.

Gordon’s attack had achieved great success. Within minutes, Fort Stedman and over 1,000 feet of Federal fortifications had been captured. Gordon tried to press the advantage, ordering Brigadier General Clement Evans’ Division to assault southward toward Fort Haskell. One member of the 100th Pennsylvania Infantry recounted, “The boys were asleep in their bunks at the first volley, but grabbed guns and cartridge boxes, not even stopping to dress. Some were barefooted; some only with shirts and pants on….The regiment had been practically cut in two. The right took shelter in the rear in some old rifle pits, while Cos. B and G ran into Fort Haskell.” This attack, however, was halted by canister fire from three Federal artillery pieces and the Federal defenders. Additional reinforcements from Major General George Pickett’s Division and Major General William “Rooney” Lee’s Cavalry Division had not arrived on the field of battle to support Gordon’s movements. Pickett’s men arrived too late to participate in the fighting, and Lee’s cavalrymen could not find an avenue to get their mounted regiments into the Federal rear. Regardless of these setbacks, Gordon sent a message to Lee alerting him to the success of the early morning attack.

However, Gordon did not know about the developing Union counterattack. General John Parke, commanding the Federal 9th Corps acted decisively. He ordered Brigadier General John F. Hartranft’s Division to retake Fort Stedman. Hartranft’s two brigades, largely green and untested troops from Pennsylvania, went to work plugging holes in the blue line, containing Confederate penetration, and thwarting Southern movement. Hartranft succeeded, completely halting the Confederate advance just short of the U.S. Military Railroad supply depot at Meade Station by 7:30 a.m. While at Fort Stedman, Gordon realized his attack was unraveling, and began scrambling to try to get his men back to safety.

At 7:45 a.m. Hartranft positioned his troops in a semicircle around Fort Stedman and the lines of works the Confederates had captured, and promptly ordered an assault. The retreating Confederates came under a heavy crossfire and suffered severe casualties. Confederate divisions, brigades, and regiments lost their cohesion, and soon found themselves pinned down, unable to retreat from their positions. Some, like Colonel Henry Rutledge of the 25th North Carolina Infantry, attempted to drive off the Union attackers. With his cap on his sword, Rutledge yelled to his men, “Don’t let them take our front, Twenty-fifth, the Twenty-fifth has never had her front taken!” Within a matter of minutes, a great portion of officers and men of the 25th North Carolina were killed, seriously wounded, or found themselves prisoners of war. Other Confederate regiments were doing their best to withdraw to their own fortifications without being shot to pieces running the gauntlet. One North Carolinian wrote, “Some laid down and was taken prisoners, but when I thought of Point Lookout [an infamous Union prisoner of war camp] you better know I come out.”

Gordon’s assault, despite the promising start, failed, and the 100th and 208th Pennsylvania Infantry regiments recaptured Fort Stedman. The four hour long action had resulted in 1,044 Union casualties (72 killed, 450 wounded, 522 missing or captured), while the Confederates lost significantly more — over 4,000 men killed, wounded, and captured. The failure at Fort Stedman weakened the Confederate defensive lines around Petersburg and Richmond, and the men lost in the battle were irreplaceable. A little more than a week after the attack at Fort Stedman, Grant’s armies broke through the Confederate lines around Petersburg, putting Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia into flight.