On the morning of March 27th, 1865, General Robert E. Lee ordered an attack to be made on a little knoll called McIlwaine Hill, located directly in front of a section of the main Confederate defensive lines around Petersburg. A few days prior, Federal soldiers from the 6th Corps, commanded by Major General Horatio Wright, had achieved a foothold on the heights of McIlwaine Hill. Realizing its importance, Lee held a council of war on March 26th, 1865. He was worried the elevated position could be used by Federal artillery to threaten key and important sections of the main Confederate earthworks.
It was ultimately decided that Major General Cadmus M. Wilcox’s Division of the Confederate 3rd Corps would spearhead the attack to retake McIlwaine Hill on the morning of March 27th. Beginning at 5am, the advance was made in complete silence, led by about 400 sharpshooters from Wilcox’s Division commanded by Captain William Dunlop, 12th South Carolina Infantry, and Major Thomas Wooten, 18th North Carolina Infantry. Not a shot was fired until the sharpshooters reached the Federal pickets belonging to Brevet Major General Lewis Grant’s and Colonel Thomas Hyde’s brigades. The Confederates were within 40 yards of the Federal picket line when the firing erupted.
Dunlop drove the Federal pickets to the right while Wooten drove the others to the left, clearing the way for Brigadier General Edward Thomas’ Georgia Brigade and Colonel Joseph H. Hyman’s North Carolina Brigade to establish a defensive position atop McIlwaine Hill. The plan for the sharpshooter battalions to breakthrough, split, and veer right and left, while the two brigades in reserve occupied the position was based on a method personally devised by Wooten. It was known as the “seine hauling method” from the fishing technique, using a net to catch and drag the fish to shore. At a signal, the column would go through the line with as little noise as possible, halt, face out, and each rank swing around right and left, taking the skirmish line in the rear, capturing the enemy with the minimum danger to Wooten’s command. Wooten’s success was phenomenal, and he had tested this strategy many times prior to the attack on McIlwaine Hill. He even received a couple commendations from Lee and Lieutenant General Ambrose P. Hill, commander of the 3rd Corps. Due to Wooten’s ingenuity, the movement was executed perfectly by the Confederate sharpshooters on the morning of March 27th.
“In the ‘blackness of darkness’ as at midnight we throttled them in their stronghold, and the crest of McIlwaine Hill blazed with the flashes of a thousand muzzles spurting death,” Dunlop remembered. “I had my hands full for a while,” wrote Captain Charles Gould, 5th Vermont Infantry, commanding the pickets from Grant’s Vermont Brigade. In a matter of moments, Gould’s sentries suffered 38 casualties, most becoming prisoners of war.
Once Dunlop, Wooten, Thomas, and Hyman had secured a defensive position atop McIlwaine Hill, Federal reinforcements were quickly brought up. An attempt was made by three Federal regiments to drive the Confederates off the knoll. With the help of Confederate artillery from their main lines, Wilcox’s boys were able to hold their positions. Following the repulse of these regiments, the firing started to die down.
A flag of truce was approved by both sides following the sharp engagement to allow for the retrieval of the wounded and the burial of the dead. During this time, officers from both sides mingled freely. Lieutenant Robert Pratt of the 5th Vermont Infantry wrote, “I went down where they met [and] saw the Rebel Brig Genl Thomas. Quite smart looking… plenty of other commissioned officers. They pretended they felt confident of success but I know they lied.” The truce lasted from 11:30am to 1pm, and following the brief break from hostilities, sharpshooting commenced once again and carried on for the rest of the day.
At the conclusion of the fighting, opinions differed in regards to the significance of the attack. The Confederates suffered only a few casualties in their assault to retake McIlwaine Hill, while the Federals lost a great deal more. Dunlop wrote it “was unquestionably one of the most daring and successful engagements of its dimensions ever witnessed upon any field during the great struggle.” Sergeant Abraham Brewer, 61st Pennsylvania Infantry, disagreed, saying “The advantage gained was slight and temporary. Little loss was inflicted upon our troops. Our blended picket line was soon straightened out, and the enemy brushed away, leaving his dead and wounded in our care.” Lee was delighted at the success of the assault, knowing Federal artillery would not have a foothold to fire with deadly effect at key locations in the main Confederate defensive line. General Ulysses S. Grant, however, was not concerned with the reverses atop McIlwaine Hill. He saw it of minor importance, as his plans for the March 29th offensive to break the Confederate lines around Petersburg did not include an attack along the 6th Corps picket lines.
